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“Representation” is perhaps the master concept of Hans Lindahl’s imposingly 
rigorous and massively erudite book, Authority and the Globalization of Inclusion and 
Exclusion.1 Lindahl conceives of legal order as a specific form of collective action 
(IACA, or “institutionalized and authoritatively mediated collective action”). 
Because, Lindahl argues, collectivities only exist in being represented—to say ‘we’ is 
to represent a multitude as a unity—law also is essentially representational. Moreover, 
a legal system operates by representing space, time, subjects, and actions as ordered 
in some particular way. Last but not least, Lindahl regards his own task as a matter of 
representing law in a particular way, namely as essentially a specific form of 
collective action. At each of these levels of analysis, the book concerns the politics of 
representation because Lindahl argues that representation inevitably operates by 
including and excluding (in a complex, dynamic way: including also what is excluded 
and excluding what is included), and he seeks to come to terms with the fundamental 
contestability that follows from this.  
I find much to learn and little to disagree with in Lindahl’s conception of law, 
including the role of representation therein. My critical remarks focus on two 
arguments that Lindahl advances which are perhaps tangential to legal theory, but 
pertinent to political theory. The first claim is about the nature of collective action: it 
essentially involves violence. This has to do with Lindahl’s view of constituent 
power. The second claim concerns democracy. Lindahl maintains that the distinction 
between participatory and representative democracy is specious because all 
democracy involves representation. Both claims, I will argue, are problematic. The 
first leads to an overly bellicose view of collective action, which obscures the 
possibility of constituent power in the mode of invitation. And the second 
compromises our ability to distinguish qualitatively among various forms of 
(purportedly) democratic involvement. Moreover, I’ll try to show that the cause of 
both problems is the same: they result from conflating two distinct senses of 
‘representation’: acting-for-someone (or representative agency) and portraying-
something-as-something (or representation-as).  
I am aware that I tread on thin ice here. Lindahl has been thinking and writing 
about representation for decades. Conceptually, his analysis of representation is much 
more careful and sophisticated than much of the literature on representation in 
political theory that I am familiar with, particularly in attending to the dynamics of 
representing-something-as-something. (In fact, it may well have been Lindahl, among 
others, who taught me to pay attention to this. 2) But if the ‘as’ tends to gets lost in 
contemporary political theory, it seems to me that Lindahl makes the opposite mistake 
                                               
1 Hans Lindahl, Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). All in-text page numbers refer to this work.  
2 Bert van Roermund (another exemplar of what one might call the “Tilburg School” in legal 
philosophy) and our Leuven colleague Tim Heysse deserve mention here, too.  
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of treating this particular sense of the word (portraying-something-as-something) as 
the only sense there is.  
  
 
Remarks on ‘representation’ 
 
Let me start with a reminder: many languages have various words that translate as 
‘representation’ in English. This speaks to the polysemy of representation: the word 
has multiple meanings. Two senses are crucial in the present context: the sense of 
acting-for-someone in the capacity of a representative, as an MP might represent a 
constituency or a lawyer a client (vertegenwoordigen in Dutch and vertreten in 
German), and the sense in which a picture might represent something: portraying-
something-as-something (voorstellen and darstellen). Call the former representative 
agency, and the latter portrayal or representation-as. Both are politically salient. At an 
abstract level, both senses involve rendering present in some sense what is also 
absent. But it is important not to conflate them.  
These senses don’t just come apart semantically, but also logically. When we 
speak of representative roles, such as when an MP is said to be the representative of 
her constituency, or the government of “the people”, the posited relation of 
representation is dyadic: x represents y. But to speak of a picture as portraying 
something in one way or another is to posit a triadic relation: x represents y as z. This 
is true also for discursive representation-as, e.g. “the MP portrays the plan as being 
contrary to the public interest”.3  
Recognizing the triadic structure of representation-as is vital to understanding the 
dynamics (and politics) of portrayal. What is represented as thus-and-so can always 
be represented differently. This is also central to Lindahl’s analysis: “Representation 
always discloses something as this, rather than as that, which entails that it is not 
possible to include without excluding” (6). This brings out the crucial “difference 
between the interpreted and the interpretation” “between something and its disclosure 
as something” (7). Likewise any particular representation-as can be taken to be about 
this, or instead about that. Any portrayal is subject to interpretation, and therefore 
contestable, both with respect to what it is a representation of (its referent) and what it 
is represented as—how it is characterized. 
We fully agree about representation-as, I believe. But in my view, Lindahl is too 
hasty to claim that all representation is to be understood along these lines: 
“representation is indissolubly representation of (something) and representation as 
(this or that)” (109). This overextends his insightful analysis, and misses the dyadic 
structure of relations of representative agency: if I call someone a representative of 
some constituency, I posit a relation with two terms. It makes no sense to call 
someone the “representative” of her constituency as thus-and-so. Of course the 
representative may represent her constituency as having such-and-such interests, but 
so may a journalist. We have now switched back to the sense of portrayal. It may be 
true that the sense of representation-as is ontologically more fundamental than 
representative agency, in that the roles of representative and constituent depend on 
being portrayed. But that does not entail that, conceptually speaking, representing, in 
                                               
3 I develop this point and some implications for theoretical disputes about representative 
democracy and constituent power in Thomas Fossen, “Constructivism and the Logic of 
Political Representation”, American Political Science Review (forthcoming). 
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the sense of acting-for-someone, can be reduced to representing in the sense of 
portraying (representing-as).  
 
 
Constituent power: imposition or invitation?   
 
With this in the back of our minds, let’s turn to the first claim I wish to discuss, which 
is about the form of power that animates collective action. Lindahl argues that law is a 
specific form of collective action, and collective action draws on and is sustained by a 
certain form of power: constituent (or constituting) power—the power through which 
groups or collectives are brought into being, as opposed to the constituted power of an 
established collective. On Lindahl’s conception, constituent power operates 
essentially through a kind of dissimulated annexation. Annexation, because Lindahl 
holds that all collective action stems from a moment of illicit appropriation, a taking 
or seizure. Someone has to take the initiative to say “we” in order to institute—to 
represent—“us” as a collective. Insofar as the initiative succeeds, the addressees are 
swept up into a collective, and this ineluctably carries an element of violence. This 
moment of violence is then veiled because in order to succeed the initiatory act must 
present itself as legitimate. And in legitimating itself, Lindahl believes, it must appeal 
to the collective agent that it seeks to bring about. The initiator thus initiates while 
pretending that the initiative has already taken place.  
Lindahl sees this bootstrapping conundrum as characteristic of all collective 
action (and consequently all law): a collective must, but cannot, authorize its own 
initiation. “Representation deploys a paradox: a foundational act of inclusion and 
exclusion can only originate a putative collective unity to the extent that it succeeds 
in representing an original unity” (292). The radical implication Lindahl draws is that 
violence is at the root of all collective action, hence all law: “To call attention to the 
moment of seizure inherent to representation is to insist that violence, even if a 
productive (but never only productive) violence, is necessarily ensconced in all legal 
orders” (181).  
Is it true that all collective action, by definition, rests on dissimulated annexation? 
This is no doubt a common, perhaps pervasive, mode of constituent power. But is it 
true as a matter of conceptual necessity? We need to carefully examine the sense or 
senses of representation involved.  
It seems to me there are two distinct ideas running through Lindahl’s argument: a 
thought about collective ontology and a normative claim about authorization. The first 
is a basic insight about the mode of existence of collectives: that they exist in being 
portrayed. The key idea, as Raf Geenens and other colleagues from Leuven have put 
the point, is that a group “needs to be represented as a collectivity in order for it to be 
a collectivity.”4 To speak of a people is to portray a multiplicity of individuals as a 
unity. The sense of representation involved here is representation-as. This, I take it, is 
the point Lindahl is making when he says, for example: “A collective, i.e. the unity 
implied in we* together, is always a represented unity, a unity that is only given 
indirectly (as this or as that), regardless of whether the collective has two, 2 billion or 
more participants” (109).  
                                               
4 Raf Geenens, Thomas Decreus, Femmy Thewissen, Antoon Braeckman, and Marta 
Resmini, “The ‘Co-Originality’ of Constituent Power and Representation,” Constellations 22, 
no. 4 (2015): 515. 
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The second thought about representation in Lindahl’s account of constituent 
power concerns the question: what entitles someone to be considered a 
representative? To genuinely speak or act on behalf of someone requires some kind of 
authorization. This is the sense he invokes in instances such as this: “[B]ecause a we* 
cannot say ‘we’, the collective on whose behalf someone first speaks and acts cannot 
have authorised the initiative in advance.” (181) (The asterisk marks the first-person 
plural standpoint of the collective in question.5) Clearly, the sense of representation at 
stake here is representative agency.  
The crux of Lindahl’s account of constituent power seems to be this: Lindahl 
believes that someone who seeks to initiate a collective—who makes a 
representational claim in the first sense, portraying a multitude as a unity—must 
necessarily claim the role of a representative of that collective in the second sense. 
This is what generates a legitimation gap, in cases where the collective appealed to 
does not yet exist. For it seems reasonable to insist that for authorization to occur, the 
authorizer must exist. Hence the apparent paradox at the heart of constituent power. 
This is clear in the following passage:  
 
“Yet, whoever seizes the initiative to act on behalf of a we* presupposes that there 
is a bounded we* that needs representation. Who occupies the we* speaker 
position claims to act on behalf of [emphasis added] the broader group of 
participants—the we* at stake—that is already deemed to exist [emphasis added] 
and for whose sake its authorities rule by articulating, monitoring and upholding 
the point of joint action. So even the first closure that includes and excludes 
claims that a closure has taken place (literally) in the past, hence that the first 
closure is no more than a restoration of an earlier closure, the boundaries of which 
may be nebulous but not effaced. [...] [T]he taking that founds a collective must 
claim to operate a retaking, the legal re-foundation of a collective.” (288-289) 
 
Is it true that an initiatory moment of portrayal is also, ipso facto, a moment of 
representative agency? I do not see why that would be so. A we* need not come into 
being because someone says “we” on its behalf. I can say “we” on my behalf, as the 
putative member of a we* to be. That is what an invitation is all about (“let us...”). 
When Peter says: “Shall we discuss Hans’ new book in Hamburg?”, he does not have 
to pretend that the collective he alludes to already exists, as a bounded whole. He has 
to imagine, and ask his addressees to imagine, a collective that could come into 
existence, and that would come into existence (and include himself and the 
addressees) as a result of appropriate uptake—a sufficient number of addressees 
accepting his invitation. This involves representation in the sense of portrayal.  
The crux of the story is how we interpret the “re-” of representation. Notice 
Lindahl’s chronological interpretation, in the passage just quoted, of the “re-” prefix: 
what is represented is “already deemed to exist”; its founding is supposed to have 
“taken place (literally) in the past”. This is what generates the paradox, for what is 
deemed to exist already before an act is supposed to be brought into existence through 
that very act. The chronological interpretation makes sense on the assumption that the 
sense of representation in question is representative agency. But here, the pertinent 
sense is that of portrayal. And in that case, the chronological reading of the “re-” 
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Legislature: Political Reflexivity and Representation,” Philosophical Explorations 6, no. 3 
(2003): 235–50. 
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prefix is too restrictive. Note again the triadic structure of representation-as: x 
(subject) represents y (referent) as z (characterization). A representational object 
denotes something and characterizes it in some specific way (e.g. a multitude as a 
unity). What it denotes, the referent, must be logically prior to being represented in 
the object. But the priority need not be chronological; it does not have to exist before 
it is invoked in representation. All that is required is that one can refer to it. And we 
can refer to all sorts of things that do not or do not yet exist—imaginary things, things 
that will or could come to exist, things that existed in the past. When Peter issues his 
invitation, he posits a collective that is as yet counterfactual, and that becomes 
determinate (i.e. comes to denote a specific set of individuals) only by invitees 
accepting his invitation and turning up. This suggests: the initiative cannot be seized 
but must be granted; there is no taking without partaking.  
Does Peter not pretend to act on behalf of the ‘we’ that he seeks to constitute? I do 
not see why we cannot say that Peter acts of his own accord, as a putative member of 
the we* to be. Of course, he must assume the standing to invite. But this standing 
does not derive from the we* he seeks to constitute. It is also true that an invitation 
usually comes unasked, may sometimes be impertinent, and you cannot un-invite 
yourself. But you can ignore or refuse an invitation. And when you do, if it is 
genuinely an invitation, that’s the end of it. If there is a profound paradox here, I do 
not see it.  
So it is true that “acts of representation [that initiate collectives] are always 
premature and depend on follow-up by those to whom they are addressed.” But that is 
not because they “have not and cannot have been authorised in advance by the 
collective that is represented” (110). Rather it is because uptake by addressees—
accepting or rejecting the invitation—is constitutive of whether the portrayal finds a 
referent (and which referent, exactly).  
In short, the idea that constituent power is essentially a moment of seizure turns 
on conflating two different senses of representation. A collective is brought into being 
through portrayal (and its uptake), not necessarily through representative agency. 
Lindahl’s account obscures the different comportments one might adopt in taking an 
initiative. When collectivities arise by means of force and violence, this is not because 
imposition is “inherent to representation” but because power is employed in the mode 
of imposition rather than invitation.  
 
 
Representative democracy: no tautology  
 
The same conflation of representative agency and representation-as is behind 
Lindahl’s remarks about democracy. Lindahl claims that all democracy is essentially 
representative democracy, joining a “representative turn” among democratic theorists 
who contest the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” democracy, or between 
“participation” and “representation”. 6 Lindahl formulates the point thus:  
 
“In effect, the well-known distinction between direct and indirect democracy, 
between participative and representative democracy, is specious: participation is a 
form of representation in the twofold sense of representation of a collective and its 
representation as this or that unity. [...] Institutionally speaking, parliaments are 
                                               
6 See, for example, Sofia Näsström, “Where Is the Representative Turn Going?,” European 
Journal of Political Theory 10, no. 4 (2011): 501–10.  
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one of the possible ways of staging representation, but by no means the only one.” 
(109)  
 
It is true that democracy cannot do without representation. But we have to be 
careful to specify in what sense, exactly. No democratic politics can do without 
portraying things in various ways: e.g. the people as a unity, the common interest as 
being such-and-such; the referendum-outcome as expressing (or failing to express) 
what “the people” want, and so on. I agree that the opposition between “direct” and 
“indirect” democracy is a simplification, one that is dangerous if it is taken to mean 
that the “will of the people” can ever be present in an unmediated way, without being 
represented, contestably, as this or as that.  
It is not true, on the other hand, that democracy by conceptual necessity requires 
that some set of people make decisions on behalf of the rest, in the special role of 
representatives, as distinct from ordinary members, of the collective. And that sense 
of representation as acting-for-others, institutionalized by means of elections, is what 
“representative democracy” ordinarily means. Understood in this sense, the 
distinction between representation and participation is not specious. There is a 
qualitative difference between making a decision or expressing an opinion 
(representing one’s own views as being thus-and-so, if you will), on the one hand, and 
relying on someone else to do so for you. This is precisely the contrast Hannah 
Arendt seeks to draw in On Revolution, when she compares revolutionary councils 
with political parties. The former aspired to manifest “the equality of those who had 
committed themselves to, and now were engaged in, a joint enterprise.”7 The latter, in 
contrast, turned on a division of roles between ordinary citizens and their 
representatives: “Even if there is communication between representative and voter, 
between the nation and parliament […] this communication is never between equals 
but between those who aspire to govern and those who consent to be governed.”8 
Lindahl obscures the difference between these modes of political involvement when 
he argues against Arendt that “it is a misconception to characterize the conflict 
between the two by asserting that ‘the issue at stake [is] representation versus action 
and participation.” (110)9  
In short: all democracy may be representational, in that it involves practices of 
portraying the will of the people as this or that, but not all democracy is by definition 
representative democracy, in that some persons are considered representative agents 
of others.  
                                               
7 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1990): 278. 
8 Ibid.: 276.  
9 Quoting ibid.: 273 
